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By hairball I refer here to those stunningly compli  cated 
network diagrams that grace the pages (and covers) of 
major  journals  with  some  regularity,  in  which  the 
vertices  or  ‘nodes’  are  annotated  with  symbols 
represent  ing  genes,  proteins  or  metabolites,  and  the 
connectors  or  ‘edges’  are  usually  so  numerous  as  to 
strain  the  resolution  of  monitors  and  printers 
(Figure 1).
While  lacking  much  of  the  aesthetic  appeal  of  a 
double helix, the hairball can be seen as iconic because 
it succinctly captures the distinctive flavor of systems 
biology. A molecular biologist and a systems biologist 
both construct their view of biology out of knowledge 
of biology’s components (nodes) and knowledge of the 
relationships among those components (edges) (Figure 
2). Where they differ is in the relative emphasis they 
place on each: to the molecular biologist, the answers 
to difficult questions are sought mainly by discovering 
nodes and linking them through edges that stand for 
qualitative causal relationships (‘gene a turns on gene 
b’; ‘enzyme x phosphorylates protein y’, and so on). To 
the  systems  biologist,  answers  are  sought  mainly 
through the investigation of networks themselves, the 
behaviors  of  which  tend  to  be  dominated  by  the 
quantitative  details  of  their  edges  more  than  by  the 
physical nature of their nodes. In molecular biology, 
explaining the existence of a phenotype or disease by 
‘finding the gene(s) for it’ is a plausible goal; in systems 
biology it is just a starting point for investigation.
Curiously, this distinction is often misconstrued. Among 
scientists, as well as the public, systems biology is fre  quently 
identified with the exploitation of high-through  put methods 
to gather vast amounts of data about genomes, epigenomes, 
transcriptomes, proteomes, meta  bo  lomes, phenomes, and 
the like. Sophisticated as such methodologies have become, 
they primarily support the tasks that molecular biologists 
have  always  faced  -  discovering  nodes  and  edges.  If  this 
were all there was to systems biology, it would be hard to 
justify  treating  it  as  anything  more  than  an  accelerated 
program of molecular biology.
But there is certainly more. In driving home this point, 
the  hairball  icon  is  again  useful,  albeit  with  different 
assignments of meaning. In this interpretation, we take 
the nodes to represent knowledge - individual sets of data 
about the biological world, including facts, observations, 
structures,  behaviors,  and  so  on  -  and  the  edges  to 
represent relationships, or connections, between bodies 
of knowledge. For example, what we know about the cell 
cycle and what we know about circadian behaviors such 
as sleep-wake cycles may be connected by virtue of the 
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Figure 1. Human proteome, and its binding interactions. 
Depiction of the data as a hairball, an increasingly familiar image in 
the biology literature. Figure kindly provided by Nicolas Simonis and 
Marc Vidal, see [14].
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fact  that  both  phenomena  are  built  upon  autonomous 
oscillators with external inputs. These bodies of know-
ledge may additionally be connected to what we know 
about  the  stripes  on  the  coats  of  tigers  and  zebras  by 
generalizing the notion of oscillation to include oscilla-
tion in space as well as time. These can be further joined 
to what we know about the formation of vertebrate body 
segments,  and  the  formation  of  patterns  on  seashells, 
through the relationship that spatial oscillations can arise 
through  the  interaction  of  temporal  oscillation  with 
stable spatial growth.
It  is  straightforward  to  see  two  things  about  the 
edges in this second kind of hairball, which serve to 
connect  bodies  of  knowledge.  First,  they  do  not 
fundamentally stand for statements of causality (zebra 
stripes  do  not  cause,  nor  are  they  caused  by,  shell 
patterns). Second, they are often peculiarly satisfying 
to learn about. When we appreciate that two or more 
very different-seeming phenomena can be treated as 
similar  in  some  way,  we  tend  to  feel  that  we  have 
accomplished  something.  This  feeling  has  a  simple 
name: understanding.
My  purpose  in  offering  this  procedural  definition  of 
under  standing  is  to  draw  an  important  distinction 
between  knowledge  and  understanding.  Factual 
discovery, whether in the biological sciences or any other 
enterprise, does not constitute understanding on its own. 
The student who correctly answers a question in class by 
downloading it off the internet with his smartphone does 
not necessarily understand anything.
Although I do not doubt that many of my colleagues in 
the sciences were lured into their professions by the thrill 
of discovering new knowledge, I would speculate that at 
least as many were attracted, as I was, by the challenge of 
understanding  the  world  in  new  ways.  It  has  always 
disappointed me that so much of the vast literature on 
how science is, or ought to be, practiced deals with the 
former goal and not the latter. Writings on the ‘scientific 
method’, whether from practicing scientists or philoso-
phers,  seem  to  deal  mainly  with  how  we  design  and 
perform  experiments  so  that  we  can  validly  infer  that 
something  is  or  is  not  the  case.  This  amounts  to  the 
question  of  how  we  arrive  at  potential  knowledge  and 
decide whether or not to accept it.
The question of how we create understanding out of 
validated bits of knowledge seems to have attracted so 
much less attention because, I suppose, it is easily seen as 
trivial. For example, if we obtain data that shutting down 
the activity of any of a certain set of genes blocks the 
ability of cells to splice pre-mRNAs, and we have previous 
data showing that the products of those genes physically 
associate  in  the  cell  to  form  a  large  supramolecular 
complex, we are easily drawn to view such a complex as a 
‘splicing machine’. Coming to this understanding is an act 
that  does  not  seem  to  require  much  effort  or  skill.  A 
graduate student will accomplish it as quickly as a senior 
professor; more quickly in some cases, because seasoned 
scientists tend to be more distrustful of the impulse to 
submerge messy facts beneath neat, orderly concepts.
There  are  many  phrases  that  describe  the  action  of 
replacing the messy with the simple to promote under-
standing:  ‘creating  an  abstraction’,  ‘generalizing’  and 
‘distilling a concept’ come to mind, but the phrase I find 
most  evoca  tive  is,  ‘building  a  model’.  When  we 
understand  a  collection  of  gene  products  as  a  splicing 
machine,  we  are  building  a  model  of  splicing  that  is 
simpler  than  the  underlying  data  set  that  produced  it. 
When  we  under  stand  the  cell  cycle  as  a  regulated 
oscillator,  or  metabolic  networks  as  systems  for 
optimizing  growth,  we  are  likewise  building  simple 
models of complex processes.
Models do not arise by logical inference from data; they 
are  acts  of  human  creation.  Any  set  of  data  can  be 
modeled  in  a  large  (perhaps  infinite)  number  of  ways. 
Our reasons for choosing one over another are not to be 
found  in  the  data  themselves,  but  rather  in  our  ideas 
about how a model will help us connect the data to other 
knowledge. This point is well illustrated in Kyle Stanford’s 
book  Exceeding  our  Grasp,  [1]  which  investigates  the 
origins  of  influential  biological  models  that  were  later 
discarded or discredited.  Stanford relates how some of 
the best minds in biology routinely failed to conceive of 
Figure 2. Hairballs are composed of nodes and edges. With 
nodes (blue) standing for elements such as genes, proteins, 
or metabolites, and edges (brown) standing for qualitative or 
quantitative relationships, hairballs are graphical representations of 
explicit models. Hairballs can also represent the act of modeling itself, 
with nodes that represent knowledge, and edges that represent the 
connections models build between bodies of knowledge.
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the  models  that  would  eventually  supplant  their  own, 
even when the later models would have equally well fitted 
all the data to which they had access.
Models are valuable in science not because they can be 
validated,  but  because  they  can  be  useful.  Indeed,  the 
entire notion of validating or invalidating models seems 
misguided. Models may be found inconsistent with a set 
of data, but that does not necessarily rob them of their 
utility. When we use Newton’s laws of motion; when we 
identify protein domains as alpha helices or beta sheets; 
even when we refer to the concentration of a reactant in a 
cell,  we  are  invoking  models  that  only  approximate 
reality.  Yet  the  simplicity  of  these  models  makes  them 
useful anyway, often more useful in day-to-day life than 
more  complicated  models  that  better  fit  the  data.  The 
idea  that  the  best  models  never  fit  all  the  data  was 
summed up 30 years ago by the statistician George Box 
when he said, ‘all models are wrong; some are useful’ [2].
My purpose in presenting this particular definition of 
‘model’ is to contrast it with views now common among 
biologists,  including  many  self-identified  systems 
biologists (for example, [3,4]). In particular, there seems 
to  be  a  prevailing  view  that  modeling  activities  are 
dramatically accelerating in biology; that the primary use 
of  modeling  is  to  predict  experimental  outcomes  that 
then validate or invalidate them; and that the overall goal 
of modeling is to generate testable hypotheses. It strikes 
me that all three statements are misapprehensions.
First, models have long been abundant in biology. Pick 
up any of the classic textbooks of molecular biology from 
the 1970s through the 1990s and you will typically find 
that  half  the  illustrations  are  models  of  some  sort  or 
another. The difference between molecular biology and 
systems  biology  is  that  models  in  the  former  field  are 
usually  represented  as  cartoons  and  arrow  diagrams, 
whereas in the latter they are more often represented as 
sets of equations or procedural instructions. It is not the 
use of modeling, per se, that is changing, it is the elements 
out  of  which  biologists  tend  to  build  models.  Such  a 
change  enables  us  to  use  our  models  to  find  different 
kinds of connections between bodies of know  ledge. For 
example, with cartoon-based modeling, we can see that 
G-proteins  and  signal-controlled  protein  kinases  are 
similar  in  that  both  use  the  thermodynamics  of 
phosphorylation and dephosphorylation to drive irre  ver-
sible switches. With equation-based modeling, however, 
we can see that the ultrasensitivity required for switch-
like  behavior  can  be  created  out  of  multisite  phos-
phorylation with distributed kinetics [5].
Second, the idea that models only serve us to the extent 
that  they  make  experimental  predictions  is,  in  my 
opinion, one of the more pernicious widely-held notions 
in biology today. While predictions may indeed flow from 
models, it is too easy for such predictions to have little 
bearing on a model’s value. To paraphrase a bad children’s 
joke, the observation that an amputee frog does not jump 
in response to verbal commands is indeed a prediction of 
the  model  that  frogs  hear  with  their  legs.  While  the 
foregoing is an intentionally facetious example, it is not 
far  off  from  the  situation  in  which  colleagues  of  mine 
have sometimes found themselves: forced by anonymous 
reviewers to make, and then test, gratuitous predictions 
of their models just to get their work published.
Of course, not all predictions are gratuitous. Demon-
strating that a model continues to fit new data can be 
extremely  helpful,  especially  when  trying  to  choose 
among a range of possible models. But there are so many 
other  ways  in  which  models  can  be  useful.  The  social 
scientist  Joshua  Epstein  recently  compiled  a  list  of  16 
other reasons for modeling besides prediction. Among 
them  are  to  provide  explanation;  illuminate  dynamics; 
suggest  analogies;  identify  new  questions;  and  demon-
strate tradeoffs [6]. Whereas these activities have nothing 
to do with prediction, they have everything to do with 
understanding.  We  also  learn  from  Epstein  that 
preoccupation with predictive modeling is not unique to 
biologists. As he remarks about his colleagues, ‘For some 
reason, the moment you posit a model, prediction - as in 
a  crystal  ball  that  can  tell  the  future  -  is  reflexively 
presumed to be your goal’ [6].
The third misapprehension - that the ultimate goal of 
modeling is to generate hypotheses - is often promoted 
by  modelers  of  biology  themselves.  According  to  this 
view, data in biology are now being gathered so rapidly, 
and in such a comprehensive way, that the pace at which 
we make experimental observations is outstripping the 
pace at which we usually formulate good hypotheses to 
test. Modeling, particularly the computational modeling 
of statistical correlations, is said to provide an efficient 
tool for finding such hypotheses amidst the mass of data 
[7,8]. A continual cycle of modeling, hypothesis genera-
tion, experimentation, and model refinement is proposed 
as the only logical way for biology to move forward.
It is true that efficient routes to hypothesis generation 
are greatly needed in biology. It is also true that models 
provide  the  structure  within  which  hypotheses  can  be 
framed. Indeed, the reason a ‘robot scientist’ can efficiently 
perform  impressive  feats  of  biological  hypothesis 
generation  and  testing  [9]  is  that  it  is  pre-programmed 
with basic models of how certain domains of biology work. 
But to characterize models solely as tools for hypothesis 
generation  underplays  the  role  of  models  as  vehicles  of 
understanding. Indeed, we could imagine a far-off future in 
which so much knowledge has been gathered that virtually 
every  imaginable  hypothesis  has  already  been  tested 
(whether intentionally or not). Would we have no need for 
models in such a future? To the contrary, with so much to 
make sense of, I would expect the need to be even greater.
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How, then, should we decide when and whether to 
model? And if modeling is meant to forge connections 
between  bodies  of  knowledge,  is  there  a  systematic 
way of making sure this succeeds? If the elements of 
one’s models are only cartoons and arrow diagrams, 
these questions are probably fairly simple to deal with. 
But  for  models  built  out  of  sets  of  mathematical 
equations and statistical constructs, as is increasingly 
the  case  in  systems  biology,  the  answers  are  by  no 
means  obvious.  Fortunately,  they  are  not  entirely 
occult  either:  making  connections  between  explicit, 
systematic  representations  of  complex  things  is  the 
bread  and  butter  of  at  least  three  fields  outside  of 
biology, namely mathematics, theoretical physics and 
‘theoretical  engineering’  (which  includes  control 
theory). That these theoretical disciplines have been 
playing  an  increasing  role  in  the  development  of 
systems biology (see, for example, [10-12]) may be a 
sign that biology is finally ready for its own ‘theory 
branch’ [13]. This suggests that the 21st century may 
be  remem  bered  as  a  time  when  biology  finally 
dedicated itself to systematic exploration, not just of 
the limits of know  ledge, but all the way to the edges of 
understanding.
Published: 12 April 2010
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